As a preliminary matter, it is virtually certain that dozens, if not hundreds, of passengers will be considering lawsuits against Seastreak for negligence. Their attorneys will have to determine why the boat crashed (and may have the assistance of the Coast Guard or law enforcement in determining this question) and whether either the operation or maintenance of that boat somehow fell below acceptable minimum standards. If so, then the passengers injured by the crash can expect significant monetary awards.

Law enforcement may have to determine whether any criminal liability should attach as well. First and foremost, if any of the passengers ultimately die as a result of injuries sustained in the crash, then employees of the company could theoretically be looking at charges of Criminally Negligent Homicide, a Class E felony under Penal Law Section 125.10, or even worse, Manslaughter in the Second Degree, Penal Law Section 125.15(1) a Class C felony.

A person is guilty of Criminally Negligent Homicide when, with criminal negligence, he causes the death of another person. “A person acts with criminal negligence with respect to a result or to a circumstances described by a statute defining an offense when he fails to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such result will occur or that such circumstance exists. The risk must be of such nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation.” See Penal Law Section 15.05[4].

A person is guilty of Manslaughter in the Second Degree when he recklessly causes the death of another person. “A person acts recklessly with respect to a result or to a circumstances described by a statute defining an offense when he is aware of an consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such result will occur or that such circumstance exists. The risk must be of such nature and degree that disregard thereof constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation. A person who creates such a risk but is unaware thereof solely by reason of voluntarily intoxication also acts recklessly with respect thereto.” See Penal Law Section 15.05[3]. The driver of the boat might theoretically be charged with Assault in the Third Degree (Penal Law Section 120.00[3], a Class A misdemeanor) for negligently causing physical injuries to another person or persons by means of a dangerous instrument.

If the operators of the ferry were determined to have acted recklessly, then charges for Reckless Endangerment and Reckless Assault might also apply for any injuries caused to victims that were hurt but not killed. A person is guilty of Assault in the Third Degree (Penal Law 120.00[2], a Class A misdemeanor) if he “recklessly causes physical injury to another person,” and can be charged with the Class D felony of Assault in the Second Degree (Penal Law 120.05[4]) where he “recklessly causes serious physical injury to another person by means of a … dangerous instrument,” such as a ferry, arguably.

Obviously, if the operators of the vessel were intoxicated at the time of the crash (though there is no such evidence available at this point), then a whole host of other criminal charges could apply as well, particularly under the Vehicular Homicide statutes in Chapter 125.

If you or a loved one were injured in the recent ferry crash, you should strongly consider contacting an experienced attorney to determine whether you may have a viable injury lawsuit against the ferry operators.

Recently, a nanny accused of murdering two children under her care, Yoselyn Ortega, was indicted for Murder in the First Degree. The basis for the first-degree charge comes from 125.27(1)(a)(xi): “the defendant intentionally caused the death of two or more additional persons within the state in separate criminal transactions within a period of twenty-four months when committed in a similar fashion or pursuant to a common scheme or plan.”

Basically, a person is guilty of Murder in the First Degree when they commit Murder in the Second Degree – the intentional killing of another person, but do so with an “aggravating factor”. In addition to the factor applied to Ms. Ortega’s case, other aggravating factors for first-degree charges include:

(i)-(iii) the murder of a police officer, peace officer, or correctional officer while performing his lawful duties;

(iv) the defendant was sentenced to life for another crime or awaiting a life sentence for another crime;

(v) the murder of a witness or the family member of a witness;

(vi) murder for hire;

(vii) “felony-murder,” meaning that the defendant killed someone in the course of committing some other violent felony such as robbery, rape, or burglary;

(viii) the defendant commits a murder but also kills another person that the defendant intended to injure

(ix) the defendant has a prior conviction for murder

(x) a torture-murder;

(xii) the victim was a judge and was targeted because he was a judge;

(xiii) a murder as an act of terrorism.

These cases are exceedingly serious and can oftentimes be very complex. If you or a loved one have been charged with Murder in the First Degree, you should strongly consider retaining a team of experienced criminal defense attorneys immediately.

The Family Court process can be daunting for a family inexperienced in defending against allegations such as these, even in juvenile arrest matters. A young defendant and his or her family will most likely be interviewed by probation and if the charge warrants it, be brought before a judge where an adjudication of juvenile delinquency can be made either through an admission or, in some cases, after a fact-finding hearing. The Family Court Act requires the attendance of the juvenile respondent and his or her counsel to be present during such a hearing. It is for this reason, that it is important that your child’s rights are protected by a lawyer experienced in handling juvenile arrest cases. If an adjudication of juvenile delinquency is made, the Family Court Act requires a dispositional hearing to take place within 10 days of the adjudication (if the charge is a felony) or within 50 days of the adjudication (for all other cases). The possible outcomes of a dispositional hearing for a juvenile defendant are three: (i) a conditional discharge, which for all intents and purposes is an order from the court requiring the juvenile to stay out of trouble and comply with whatever other conditions the court deems necessary to correct the behavior, (ii) probation, which would imply reporting to a probation officer for a set period of time, or, in extreme cases (iii) placement in a juvenile detention facility. The court’s decision will be the result of a balancing of the needs of the juvenile against the need to protect the community.

Simply put, should a loved one or family member of yours require assistance in sorting out a family court or adult criminal matter, you should call The Law Office of Matthew Galluzzo.

The prosecution presented evidence that the defendant got into a parked delivery truck without permission and, while intoxicated, caused it to roll downhill through an intersection and strike three persons (killing one child and seriously injuring two other people). The defendant testified that he observed the parked truck suddenly start rolling downhill, and that he jumped into the moving vehicle in a heroic, but ultimately unsuccessful, attempt to prevent it from causing harm.

The majority (by 3-2 vote) overturned the conviction because the trial judge declined to charge the jury on the defense of justification, provided in Penal Law Section 35.05:

“[C]onduct which would otherwise constitute an offense is justifiable and not criminal when: 2. Such conduct is necessary as an emergency measure to avoid an imminent public or private injury which is about to occur by reason of a situation occasioned or developed through no fault of the actor, and which is of such gravity that, according to ordinary standards of intelligence and morality, the desirability and urgency of avoiding such injury clearly outweigh the desirability of avoiding the injury sought to be prevented by the statute defining the offense in issue… Whenever evidence relating to the defense of justification under this subdivision is offered for the defendant, the court shall rule as a matter of law whether the claimed facts and circumstances would, if established, constitute a defense.”

It is unsurprising that defendant was convicted, as the credible evidence against him seemed overwhelming. The defendant’s blood was taken after his arrest, and the subsequent chemical tests on the blood revealed that he likely had a blood alcohol content (BAC) of approximately .13 and .17% at the time of the accident. For context, it is a crime to drive a motor vehicle in New York state with a BAC of .08% or higher. Also, a key prosecution witness, Carlos Montilla, testified that he observed defendant – whom he had known for over ten years – get out of the truck after the crash and state that he was “joking around” and “had taken the truck to play a trick on the owner”. He also testified that he observed the defendant drinking beer on the corner earlier in the day. In response, the defendant testified that he had not been drinking alcohol and that he did not know Carlos Montilla.

Clearly, the defendant’s testimony, from here, sounds more than a little far-fetched. Indeed, Judge McGuire, writing for the dissent, opined that “defendant’s claim… was preposterous, particularly because the evidence that defendant was intoxicated also was overwhelming and unrefuted.” Thus, the failure to charge on this defense was harmless in the dissent’s view. The dissent also agreed with the trial prosecutor’s argument that according to the defendant, the defendant did not, in fact, commit a crime, and this particular justification charge under Penal Law Section 35.05 only applies to criminal conduct done justified by emergency circumstances. In response, the majority argued that the jury could have concluded that the defendant had been lying about his intoxication, but truthful about jumping into the moving vehicle and trying to prevent the accident.

The decision seems to suggest that to be safe, a trial judge will need to charge the jury on justification anytime there is any possibility that the jury could conclude that the defendant had committed a crime in order to prevent an injury, regardless of whether the credible evidence reasonably supported that conclusion or whether it was even the defendant’s theory of the case.

Mr. Rodriguez’s sentence of 6 to 15 years was vacated and the case was remanded for a new trial. However, the Bronx District Attorney’s Office will almost certainly seek leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals, New York’s highest state court.