A gag order basically instructs a party to a litigation to refrain from speaking publicly about the case. A New York judge overseeing a criminal case has the power to issue a gag order over one or more of the parties to the case. Gag orders are relatively rare, however. They certainly are not done as a matter of routine. The Constitution guarantees the right to free speech, after all, and courts are generally loath to abridge those rights. However, gag orders may be necessary to protect other valuable rights under the Constitution, such as the right to a fair trial (contained in the Sixth Amendment of the Bill of Rights), as well as the all-important “true administration of justice”.

Sometimes defense attorneys ask courts to order prosecutors not to talk about their clients’ cases publicly for fear that they would prejudice any potential jurors. For example, the attorneys for Ghislaine Maxwell – convicted in Manhattan federal court of assisting notorious sex trafficker Jeffrey Epstein – contended that the federal prosecutors had tainted potential jurors by hosting press conferences in which they laid out the facts of their case. Ultimately that application for a gag order was denied, but the federal judge did admonish the attorneys to adhere to the rules of professional conduct for lawyers, which generally prohibits attempts to unfairly influence juries (or potential juries) outside of the courtroom. After all, the paramount rule of trials was explained by Justice Holmes in 1907: “The theory of our system is that the conclusions to be reached in a case will be induced only by evidence and argument in open court, and not by any outside influence, whether private talk or public print.” Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907).

Sometimes defense attorneys work the media circuit and give pre-trial interviews to the press to try to influence potential jurors before their clients proceed to trial. Trump’s attorneys appear to be doing quite a bit of that lately. In one case, the attorneys for Joey Buttafuoco were gagged by a judge because of their admitted attempts to sway the jury pool with statements to the media. People v. Buttafuoco, 158 Misc. 2d 174 (County Court, Nassau 1993). That gag order was especially easy to justify in light of the Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 7-107 (22 NYCRR 1200.38) relating to trial publicity, which prohibits the sort of behavior done by the attorneys.

Prosecutors do not have a right to a fair trial, per se, because that right stems from the U.S. Constitution and protects individuals accused of crimes. One might think, then, that a defendant cannot be gagged. After all, the purpose of a gag order – normally – is to protect a defendant’s right to a fair trial. However, a gag order can be imposed upon a defendant where the defendant makes deliberate attempts to undermine the “true administration of justice” by tampering with the jury pool and making extrajudicial statements. Already, Mr. Trump has made numerous postings in social media (Truth Social etc) about the alleged bias of the prosecutor and the trial judge, and slammed the charges as being baseless and politically motivated, among other things. Mr. Trump might argue that his statements about the case relate to his campaign for president. While that may be true in part, there is no question that he hopes to persuade potential jurors of his innocence by making these claims about the case. In the least, he has to be aware of the fact that his public statements about the case – which immediately become the subject of numerous national media stores – could taint the jury pool in Manhattan. So, a gag order seems likely in this case. In short, if Mr. Trump wants to speak to the jurors in his case, he will have to take the oath and subject himself to cross-examination.

Given what we know of Mr. Trump’s personality and character, it seems inevitable that he would violate such a gag order and speak publicly about the charges. Notwithstanding his general inclination to talk about everything that crosses his mind, it would actually be difficult to run for president without discussing pending criminal charges against oneself. So, then, it is worth asking what would happen if Mr. Trump were to violate the gag order.

Violations of gag orders are prosecuted by courts pursuant to N.Y. Judiciary Law Section 750. A court would have to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the issue of the violation of the court order before rendering a decision. The decision would be made by the court and not a jury. The maximum jail punishment for a violation would be thirty days at Rikers Island. There could also be a fine up to $1000.00.

Courts in the past have considered whether judges who have been personally attacked or criticized by a litigant outside of the courtroom can be permitted to preside over the subsequent contempt proceeding. The Supreme Court has concluded that “[a] constitutional rule which disqualifies a Judge solely based upon criticism of rulings and disobedience to court orders during a trial is excessive and unwarranted.” In re Hirschfield, 184 Misc.2d 119, 122 (N.Y. County Sup. Ct. 1999) It should not be assumed “that judges are so irascible and sensitive that they cannot fairly and impartially deal with resistance to their authority or with highly charged arguments about the soundness of their decisions.” Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 584 (1964). But a judge might be disqualified from presiding over a contempt hearing on a gag order where the judge becomes so “embroiled in… controversy” that he should recuse himself based upon the “likelihood of bias.” Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 501 (194).

Prosecutors might request a gag order at Mr. Trump’s arraignment on April 4. The court may decline to issue such an order at this point, and may instead admonish the parties not to speak publicly about the case. But if Mr. Trump and his attorneyscontinue to wage a public media campaign about the case, then the judge will likely be inclined to grant a gag order. One doubts that Mr. Trump could possibly abide by such an order, or that he would. In that case, it seems altogether plausible that we will have a violation hearing on a gag order with the very real possibility of Mr. Trump being incarcerated pre-trial for a violation of a gag order. But that of course remains to be seen.

Matthew Galluzzo is a criminal defense attorney in New York City and former Assistant D.A. in Manhattan. He has appeared as a legal commentator on CNN, MSNBC, Fox, ABC, Dateline, BBC, and other television news programs throughout the world. He has been quoted by newspapers including the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, and the Economist, among others. Fluent in French, Mr. Galluzzo has also been interviewed countless times in French by European and Canadian news channels. For his services to the French government and French citizens facing criminal charges, Mr. Galluzzo was recently named a knight in the French National Order of Merit.

According to a press release from the prosecutor, Mr. DiMassa supposedly formed an LLC with another person and used that LLC to bill the City of West Haven for consulting services that were not in fact provided. Allegedly, Mr. DiMassa made withdrawals from the LLC at about the same time he made large chip purchases at Mohegan Sun casino. One might suspect the government to argue that Mr. DiMassa’s fraud was the result of a gambling addiction.

Of course, nothing has been proven as of yet. But if Mr. DiMassa is in fact convicted of wire fraud for allegedly stealing $600,000, he is likely looking at a Federal Sentencing Guidelines range of between 33 and 57 months. In federal cases, crimes have minimum and maximum penalties, but judges use an advisory system called the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to narrow down the sentencing range. Those guidelines give defendants and attorneys an idea of what to expect at sentencing, but are nevertheless just approximations. This table provides the guidance.

Assuming that Mr. DiMassa has no significant criminal record, he would be categorized as Criminal History Category I (for first offenders). Then, people convicted of wire fraud begin at a base offense level of 7. A loss of $600,000 adds an additional 14 offense levels. He might also get an additional 2 level enhancement for defrauding a government agency. See USSG 2B1.1(b)(9). At a sentencing level of 23, he would be facing a Guidelines range of 46-57 months. If he were to plead guilty and accept responsibility, however, he would probably receive a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, yielding a final offense level of 20 and a Guidelines range of 33-41 months in prison.

Most federal defendants plead guilty after negotiating the general terms of the guilty plea (i.e. the amount of fraudulent loss attributable to the defendant, the role of the defendant in the crime, etc), and then a judge determines the specific and appropriate sentence for the defendant after the guilty plea has been entered. Federal criminal practice differs significantly from state court practice in this regard, as most sentences are explicitly negotiated before pleading guilty in state court. In federal court, when defendants plead guilty, they have an idea of what they might receive, but they don’t really know for sure what will happen to them until after their guilty pleas have been irrevocably entered before the court.

Also, if he is convicted, Mr. DiMassa will also certainly be required to pay restitution in the full amount, and/or sign a forfeiture order such that property belonging to him can be seized by the government to pay back the criminal debts.

If you or a loved one have been arrested for federal wire fraud, you should strongly consider contacting Matthew Galluzzo. Mr. Galluzzo is a former Manhattan prosecutor and current resident of Connecticut, with over twenty years of experience in criminal law. He is a member of the Criminal Justice Act panels for both the Eastern and Southern Districts of New York, meaning that federal judges appoint him to represent defendants in difficult federal cases throughout New York City, and he is admitted to practice in federal court in Connecticut.

Normally, in federal court, when a defendant chooses to plead guilty, he or she enters into a plea agreement with the prosecutors to establish certain terms and parameters for the sentencing. Plea agreements look like contracts and are usually at least five single-spaced pages long. A defendant acknowledges in the document that he/she is pleading guilty knowingly and voluntarily, and that he/she cannot take back the guilty plea once it has been entered before the court at a plea hearing. The agreements usually set forth the minimum and maximum possible penalties for the charged offenses, so that the defendant can acknowledge that he/she understands them. Also, a defendant agrees to plead guilty to certain charges in the indictment, and admits to certain conduct (for example, an amount of money fraudulently stolen, or a quantity of narcotics trafficked) that impacts the sentencing. Then, the parties to the plea agreement (the prosecutor and the defendant) agree to certain other factors (such as the defendant’s role in the offense, for example) that may establish where on the sentencing chart (for the Federal Sentencing Guidelines) that defendant’s sentence is likely to be. But, the agreements explicitly state that the ultimate decision as to the defendant’s sentence will be up to the sentencing judge to determine, based upon these established facts and parameters within the plea agreement, as well as the judge’s own considerations of the defendant and the defendant’s crime.

Here, in Ms. Loughlin’s case, the sentence has already been established by the agreement. This fact makes the agreement quite unusual for federal court, though hardly unprecedented. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C), Ms. Loughlin has agreed to plead guilty to conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud, and in exchange, she will receive a sentence of two months in prison, a fine of $150,000.00, 24 months of supervised release with 100 hours of community service, and a special assessment of $100. The prosecution also will agree to dismiss the remaining charges against Ms. Loughlin and not pursue any further charges in connection with what it knows about this affair. This all depends, however, upon the court accepting the agreement and Ms. Loughlin’s guilty plea.

Basically, pursuant to Rule 11(c)(1)(C), the court has to decide whether to accept this agreement with these terms before it will officially count. Tomorrow, during the sentencing hearing, the judge will ask Ms. Loughlin (with her attorney) whether she understands the agreement and its terms, and whether she is pleading guilty knowingly and voluntarily. The judge will then likely ask the prosecutor why the government feels this disposition is appropriate. Then, in the ensuing months, the prosecutor and the defense attorneys will submit written memoranda to the judge about why this disposition is appropriate. The defense memoranda will likely include a statement from Ms. Loughlin and supporting “character letters” from friends and family and people in the community. Ms. Loughlin will also undergo a biographical interview by a federal probation officer (usually a social worker) to be used to prepare a pre-sentence report about Ms. Loughlin for the judge. At the sentencing hearing, the court will indicate once and for all whether it considers the disposition to be appropriate. Assuming the judge does in fact find the disposition appropriate, the judge will sentence Ms. Loughlin as set forth in the agreement. In response, the prosecutor will move to dismiss the remaining criminal charges against Ms. Loughlin. If the court rejects Ms. Loughlin’s plea agreement, then the matter will start over as if Ms. Loughlin had not pleaded guilty.

These Rule 11(c)(1)(C) pleas can be advantageous in that they tend to provide more certainty for the parties. Normally, defendants plead guilty and find out their sentence at the sentencing date; sometimes the possible sentencing ranges can vary enormously. As a former state prosecutor accustomed to negotiating plea deals with fixed and expected penalties, it has always been somewhat confusing to me about how reluctant federal prosecutors are when it comes to these types of agreements. Federal prosecutors in New York and elsewhere routinely say “our office just doesn’t do that,” when asked about possible Rule 11(c)(1)(C) pleas. For whatever reason, most federal prosecutors just feel far more comfortable having courts decide upon appropriate sentences, rather than negotiate them themselves. Regardless, it seems highly unlikely here that Ms. Loughlin’s plea agreement will be rejected, or that she will not receive the expected sentence. The terms are not out of line with what other defendants in the “Varsity Blues” case have already received, and she might have received a sentence like this one with a “typical” open-ended plea agreement, anyway. Indeed, it might have been possible for her to avoid a prison sentence altogether in this case, but in light of the sentences handed out to other defendants by this court, it was probably in Ms. Loughlin’s best interests to eliminate the downside risk of receiving a more significant prison sentence by negotiating for this Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea.

If you or a loved one have been charged with federal mail or wire fraud, you should strongly consider contacting an experienced federal criminal defense attorney. Matthew Galluzzo, a former Manhattan prosecutor, regularly represents federal criminal defendants in federal courts across the country, and is a member of the Criminal Justice Act panels for both the Southern and Eastern District Courts of New York.

Most of the time however, people accused of this crime are frequently also charged with other crimes, too. For example, this charge is frequently brought against those who lie to U.S. Customs officials about their possession of cash, in conjunction with a charge of 31 USC § 5361(a)(1)(A). It is also common in health care fraud matters for a defendant to be charged with violating both 18 U.S.C. § 1035 – making false statements relating to health care matters – as well as 18 U.S.C. § 1001. In any case, the additional charge for making false statements may not be as serious as the underlying crime for which the defendant was originally investigated, but the fact that the defendant lied to law enforcement can be viewed as an “aggravating factor” by the judge at sentencing, meaning that it could seriously increase the ultimate sentence that the defendant will serve.

Though the maximum possible statutory penalty for this offense is five years in prison, pursuant to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, the base offense level for this crime is 6. This base offense level means that a person convicted of this crime (and this crime alone) is more likely to receive a sentence of between 0 to 6 months in prison.

If you or a loved one have been arrested or are being investigated by federal law enforcement officers, you should strongly consider hiring the experienced federal criminal defense attorneys at the Law Office of Matthew Galluzzo. Their team of former Manhattan prosecutors has successfully represented individuals arrested and accused of making false statements to law enforcement officers. They may be able to help you as well.

Federal assault charges can apply to any person who causes an offensive physical touching to another person on the airplane. Certainly, that can apply to physical violence, but it might also apply to unwanted sexual touching of another person as well. Assaulting another person on an airplane is normally a petty offense under federal criminal law, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(5). (Those accused of sexually assaulting others on airplanes can also be prosecuted with the more serious felony charge of 18 U.S.C. § 2244(b), however, and attempts to maim or murder can be prosecuted as felonies, as well). That means that the crime is a misdemeanor with a maximum prison penalty of six months and/or a fine of $5000.00. Also, it means that the defendant is not entitled to a jury trial. Instead, the defendant must have his case tried by a federal magistrate judge.

Locating and interviewing witnesses in these cases is of paramount importance to the defense. Occasionally, shaky cell phone video footage might be available of the incident or dispute, and it may actually vindicate the accused person. Sometimes defendants have even acted unknowingly or unintentionally, by virtue of intoxicated or sleep disorders, and such defense should be explored and developed if applicable.

If you or a loved one have been arrested or accused of committing that crime in the New York or New Jersey area (JFK, LaGuardia, or Newark airports, for example), you should strongly consider retaining the services of the experienced criminal defense attorneys at the Law Office of Matthew Galluzzo. Matthew Galluzzo, in particular, has successfully earned trial acquittals and non-jail sentences in cases involving federal charges or assaults on airplanes.

The sentencing range for the original criminal charges under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines was 12-18 months (Base Offense Level of 13 with a two level increase for obstructing justice offset by a possible two level reduction for acceptance of responsibility following a guilty plea). Of course, the client also now faced the possibility of additional criminal charges and penalties for acting as a fugitive and failing to appear in court. The prosecution initially submitted a proposed plea agreement whereby the client would receive a sentence of between 12-18 months in prison.

However, the attorneys at The Law Office of Matthew Galluzzo presented to the federal prosecutor considerable mitigating evidence of our client’s life story and family, as well as circumstances surrounding his original crimes. Ultimately, the prosecutors agreed to allow the client to plead guilty to the second count of the original indictment and avoid additional charges for acting as a fugitive. The second count of the indictment carried a 0-6 month Guidelines sentence, representing a considerable savings on the original 12-18. Then, we were able to persuade the judge to schedule an expedited sentencing hearing and ultimately to sentence our client to time served. Thus, instead of receiving a sentence of between 12-18, as it originally appeared our client would, our client received a sentence of less than four months. Obviously, the client is quite happy with the result.

If you or a loved one have been arrested for a violation of federal criminal law in Brooklyn or Queens (i.e. the Eastern District of New York), you should strongly consider contacting the experienced federal criminal defense attorneys at the Law Office of Matthew Galluzzo. Their team of former prosecutors has considerable experience representing individuals charged with a wide variety of crimes in that courthouse, and may be able to help you as well.

Federal criminal law prohibits a wide range of activities relating to transporting people and/or traveling across state lines or internationally for the purpose of engaging in illegal sexual activity. Specifically, 18 U.S.C. § 2423 prohibits four types of activities and carries very severe penalties.

First, 18 U.S.C. § 2423 makes it a felony punishable by a minimum of 10 years in prison (and by as much as life in prison) to “knowingly transport[] an individual who has not attained the age of 18 years in interstate or foreign commerce… with intent that the individual engage in prostitution, or in any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense.” This provision obviously applies to those engaging in the human trafficking of underage prostitutes, and also potentially applies to an adult who drives or attempts to drive a minor across state lines so that he or she can have sex with that minor in another state. It could also apply to people who purchase bus or plane tickets for minors to travel into the U.S. or across state lines for the purpose of engaging in illegal sex.

Next, 18 U.S.C. § 2423 makes it a federal felony punishable by up to 30 years to travel across state lines, into the United States, or even to a foreign country (if that person is a U.S. citizen or permanent resident) for the purpose of engaging in illegal sexual conduct. So, this means that it is illegal to travel across state lines to hire a prostitute or have sexual contact with an underage person. It also means that it is illegal for a citizen or permanent resident to travel to a foreign country to hire a prostitute or have sex with a minor. Interestingly, a person can be guilty of this crime without actually engaging in the sexual conduct, so long as the prosecutor can prove the illegal purpose of the travel. This charge is frequently brought in cases involving undercover sting operations, in which the supposed prostitute or underage person is actually an FBI agent.

18 U.S.C. § 2423 prohibits illegal sexual intercourse after having traveled across state lines or into the U.S., or even to a foreign country (if that person is a U.S. citizen or permanent resident). Occasionally, U.S. citizens get arrested returning to the United States because Customs officers discover incriminating photographs or videos during border inspections of their laptops, phones, or cameras. Most people are surprised to learn that their electronic devices can be searched at U.S. Customs without probable cause or a warrant. Registered sex offenders returning from known “sex tourism” countries should be prepared to have their devices inspected at the border.

Finally, 18 U.S.C. § 2423 makes it a federal felony punishable by up to 30 years to arrange for the interstate or international transport of people for the purpose of engaging in illegal sex (i.e. prostitutes or minors), for commercial advantage or private financial gain. This could apply not onto the pimp or chief of a human trafficking operation, but also to the driver of a vehicle.

If you or a loved one have been arrested or accused of violating 18 U.S.C. § 2423, you should strongly consider hiring the experienced criminal defense attorneys at the Law Office of Matthew Galluzzo. In particular, Matthew Galluzzo is a former Sex Crimes prosecutor and acknowledged expert in the field. Mr. Galluzzo has earned dozens of difficult dismissals and numerous trial acquittals for individuals charged with serious sex crimes. He is routinely interviewed by television and radio news outlets regarding sex crimes investigations, and was even once hired by the government of South Africa to fly there to train its law enforcement officers about modern rape investigation techniques. Plainly put, his talent and qualifications for these sorts of cases are beyond dispute, and he may be able to help you.

According to numerous reports, Harvey Weinstein has been indicted on charges of Rape in the First Degree, Rape in the Third Degree, and Criminal Sexual Act in the First and Third Degrees. The first-degree charges are Class B violent felonies, meaning that they are punishable by a minimum of 5 years and a maximum of 25 years in prison. Rape in the First Degree (Penal Law Section 130.35) applies to cases in which defendants allegedly use forcible compulsion (physical force or the threat of physical force or harm) to engage in non-consensual vaginal intercourse. Criminal Sexual Act in the First Degree (Penal Law Section 130.50) applies to cases in which the defendants have allegedly used forcible compulsion to non-consensually penetrate mouths or anuses with their penises. (Thus, the distinction between “Rape” and “Criminal Sexual Act” under New York criminal law is the orifice being penetrated.) The third-degree varieties of these charges most commonly are applied in situations where a person is “incapable of consent,” meaning physically helpless (i.e. asleep or intoxicated). These third-degree charges are Class E felonies without mandatory minimum prison sentences.

It should come as no surprise that Weinstein was indicted given that he was arrested and preliminarily charged with these same crimes. Indeed, an indictment by the grand jury was basically a sure thing once the decision to arrest Weinstein was made. Weinstein could have testified before the grand jury in his own defense but that would have been a tactical mistake. A grand jury presentation in a case like this normally involves a prosecutor simply calling the complainant to testify under oath before the grand jurors about the crime. A defendant being indicted (for any crime, not just rape and sexual assault) does not get to listen to the witnesses testifying against him in the grand jury, nor does his attorney have the right to cross-examine those witnesses or make arguments to the grand jury. However, by testifying before the grand jury, Weinstein would have subjected himself to being cross-examined by a prosecutor under oath. That decision would have locked him into a version of events that he could not later modify or correct for trial. Equally problematically, it would have given the prosecutor an opportunity to hear Weinstein’s trial testimony prior to trial. This would have afforded the prosecutor months (or maybe even years) to prepare a scathing cross-examination for trial after having a “practice round” with him in the grand jury. Given that the odds of prevailing at the grand jury are normally terrible for a defendant – and probably especially so for Weinstein given the publicity surrounding his situation – there was realistically very little for Weinstein to gain from testifying before the grand jury. Most defendants understandably decline to do so.

The odds of prevailing in the grand jury are poor because it does not take much convincing of the grand jury for a prosecutor to earn an indictment. A grand jury consists of 23 people, and only twelve (12) of those 23 must find that there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant has committed a crime. Plainly put, the prosecutor only need convince half of the grand jury that it is possible that the defendant is guilty. That’s an extremely low bar to clear, and it is the reason why lawyers routinely quip that a decent prosecutor “can indict a ham sandwich” if so motivated.

Now that Weinstein has been indicted, he will be arraigned in Supreme Court on the new accusatory instrument (the indictment) in about six weeks or so. Prosecutors can request an increase in bail for defendants who have been indicted, but I would not expect that to be requested or granted at this point. After all, Mr. Weinstein has already posted a considerable amount of negotiated bail and will present himself on time at his arraignment.

Weinstein’s attorneys will file pretrial motions with the court following this Supreme Court arraignment. In this case, I expect that we will see considerable pre-trial litigation (motions in limine) regarding the testimony of other alleged victims of Mr. Weinstein. In the Bill Cosby case, by way of comparison, the prosecutors were permitted to present testimony of several other victims to demonstrate Mr. Cosby’s modus operandus in subjecting women to non-consensual sexual contact. The trial judge permitted this testimony in Mr. Cosby’s case even though Mr. Cosby was not charged with any crimes involving those other women. Something similar could happen in this case, because there appear to be many Weinstein victims. Obviously, this is an incredibly important issue for Weinstein’s defense team, as the testimony of other similar victims could easily make the case against him overwhelming (just as it did in Mr. Cosby’s case, ultimately).

Interestingly, Weinstein’s defense attorney has claimed that he intends to seek dismissal of the indictment by the reviewing judge. In all cases, a Supreme Court judge must review the transcript from the grand jury presentation to ensure that the prosecutor properly instructed the grand jury as to the applicable law and that the evidence presented was legally sufficient. Defense lawyers routinely move for dismissals of indictments without having read the legal instructions that were given to the grand jury because they do not ever get copies of those instructions. And, defense attorneys normally do not normally have copies of the witnesses’ grand jury testimony at that point, as those documents are usually turned over shortly before the beginning of trial. So, I admit that I am puzzled as to why the defense attorney seems confident that the indictment will be dismissed upon his motion. It seems extraordinarily unlikely that the indictment would be legally insufficient. After all, the judge would have to affirm the sufficiency of the indictment so long as it is theoretically possible that the defendant is guilty where it is assumed that the witnesses were believed by a jury. Thus, in a sexual assault case, so long as the complainant says that she was subjected to non-consensual sexual contact, an indictment is likely to be sufficient.

I suspect that the defense believes that the indictment will be dismissed because the prosecutor failed to present evidence of the defendant’s innocence. This is potentially an interesting argument, albeit a somewhat unusual one. A prosecutor normally controls what evidence is presented to a grand jury, so the presentations are routinely one-sided. However, there is some case law to support the proposition that a prosecutor must present a “fair” presentation to the grand jury, meaning that if there is evidence of the defendant’s innocence, that the prosecutormust also present it along with the evidence of the defendant’s guilt. For example, if a witness known to the prosecution says that a defendant shot someone on Monday, but another witness known to the prosecution says that the witness was somewhere else on Monday, then that second witness should be presented to the grand jury (though, honestly, the prosecution should be rethinking its decision to indict at that point). The defense in this case may have told the prosecutors that they were obligated to present evidence of a consensual relationship between a complainant and the defendant. Of course, even if there exists evidence that the defendant and the complainant had a consensual relationship at one point, it does not mean that a rape did not occur as the complainant described. So, the prosecutors probably refused to present that evidence, and that would explain the defense’s somewhat bold statements about the dismissal of the indictment. (Of course, puffery by defense attorneys speaking to the press is hardly uncommon).

Plea bargain negotiations would normally take place after the indictment as well, but I do not suspect that there will be any agreements here between the prosecution and defense. Legally, the prosecution cannot offer Weinstein anything less than a plea to a Class C violent felony, which carries a minimum jail sentence of 3.5 years in jail. (It might be possible if the DA took the rather unusual and extreme step of asking a judge to dismiss the top count of the indictment for the sole purpose of effectuating a plea bargain agreement, but a judge would be unlikely to grant such a motion without any better reason than that).

Thus, it seems that we should probably expect a trial sometime in about twelve to eighteen months from now (and it certainly could be farther away than that). Another blog post will discuss the strategies the defense is likely to employ.

The author of this post, Matthew Galluzzo, is a former Manhattan sex crimes prosecutor now working as a criminal defense attorney with the law firm of Matthew Galluzzo PLLC.