Precursor Chemicals, Fentanyl Supply Chains & New York Federal Courts

The synthetic opioid crisis in the U.S. has increasingly shifted upstream: rather than just prosecuting those who distribute the finished product (Fentanyl or analogues thereof), federal authorities are now focusing on the chemicals that go into making fentanyl (“precursor chemicals”) and the international supply chain.
In particular, both the Eastern and Southern Districts of New York have brought cases where foreign‐based chemical companies, their executives or brokers, have been indicted for importing or distributing chemicals that can be used (or were known to be used) to manufacture fentanyl.

For example:

• In E.D.N.Y., in January 2025 the U.S. Attorney’s Office announced indictments of two Indian chemical companies and a senior executive, alleging they “smuggled fentanyl precursor chemicals from India to the United States knowing they would be used to manufacture fentanyl.” Department of Justice
• In S.D.N.Y., in December 2024 a key indictment charged three international chemical brokers for importing ton‐quantities of fentanyl and methamphetamine precursor chemicals from China to the United States. Department of Justice+1

These cases reflect a prosecutorial strategy: if you can shut off the supply of precursor chemicals, you can disrupt the manufacturing of fentanyl before it hits the U.S. market.

Criminal Charges and Potential Penalties

Here are the common statutes and charges used in these precursor chemical cases, and the kinds of penalties the U.S. Attorney’s Offices signal in their press releases.

Typical charges

Some recurring charges include:

• Conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance (or precursor chemical) with intent to manufacture a controlled substance. 21 USC Section 841 and 21 USC Section 846.
• Conspiracy to import a listed chemical (i.e., a precursor chemical) knowing that it will be used to manufacture a controlled substance.
• Importation (or attempted importation) of a listed chemical/precursor chemical into the U.S. with intent to manufacture a controlled substance. 21 USC Section 952.
• Smuggling, customs‐fraud, false statements in connection with shipping, mislabelling of shipments (to facilitate concealment).
• Money-laundering (often when proceeds from the precursor chemical sales are moved via cryptocurrency or other channels).

Statutory maximums and remarks from actual cases

• In S.D.N.Y., the December 2024 case: the defendants are charged with (a) one count of conspiracy to distribute fentanyl and methamphetamine (10 years minimum, up to life) ; (b) one count of conspiracy to import precursor chemicals with intent to manufacture (max 20 years) ; (c) one count of importation of a fentanyl precursor chemical (max 20 years) ; (d) conspiracy to commit money laundering (max 20 years). Department of Justice+1
• In S.D.N.Y., earlier in June 2023 the U.S. Attorney announced an indictment of a China‐based chemical company and its executives. The press release included a chart of penalties: for a fentanyl‐trafficking conspiracy, mandatory minimum 10 years and up to life; for conspiracy/importation of a precursor chemical with intent, up to 20 years; etc. Department of Justice
• In E.D.N.Y., Jan 2025: the press release states that the senior executive “faces up to 53 years in prison” if convicted of all charges. Department of Justice

Key observations

• Although many of the precursor‐chemical importation charges carry statutory maximums (often up to 20 years), the more serious “trafficking/fentanyl”‐type conspiracies may carry mandatory minimums or life‐limits.
• The government often emphasizes in press releases not just the legal maximums but also the scale of the conduct (tons of precursor chemicals, shipments mislabeled, links to cartels) to underscore the seriousness of the offense.
• Money‐laundering charges (when present) add another layer and often carry substantial maximums as well.
• Penalties also often include substantial fines (for companies and individuals), and forfeiture of assets. For example, the June 2023 S.D.N.Y. press release mentioned fines for organizations and individuals—though the exact fine amounts depend on gross pecuniary gain or loss. Department of Justice

Recent Example Cases in the Two Districts

Here’s a more detailed look at two representative cases — one from E.D.N.Y., one from S.D.N.Y. — with the lessons they hold.

E.D.N.Y. – Two Indian chemical companies & a senior executive (Jan 6 2025)

In the January 6 2025 E.D.N.Y. press release, the U.S. Attorney’s Office announced unsealed indictments of two India-based companies (Raxuter Chemicals and Athos Chemicals Pvt. Ltd.) and a founder/senior executive (Bhavesh Chhodbhai Lathiya) of one of them. Department of Justice
Key points from that announcement:

• The defendants were charged with conspiracy to distribute and import “listed chemicals” (i.e., precursor chemicals) knowing they would be used to manufacture fentanyl; also importation distribution of a listed chemical. Department of Justice
• The companies allegedly used deceptive shipping methods: mislabelling packages (for example, a shipment described as “Vitamin C” but actually containing 1-boc-4-piperidone, a List I chemical). Department of Justice
• One of the shipments: 20 kg of 1-boc-4-piperidone shipped to the Eastern District of New York, mislabeled as an antacid. Department of Justice
• If convicted of all charges, the executive (Lathiya) faces up to 53 years in prison. Department of Justice
  Take-away: This case underscores the international supply chain (chemicals from India to U.S.), the mislabelling/packaging deception, and the upward leverage of prison exposure for executives abroad.

S.D.N.Y. – Chinese chemical company executives convicted (Feb 3 2025) & Sentenced (Sept 19 2025)

• The S.D.N.Y. press release of February 3 2025: two Chinese chemical company executives (Qingzhou Wang and Yiyi Chen) convicted by a jury of importation of fentanyl precursor chemicals and money laundering. Department of Justice
• The September 19 2025 S.D.N.Y. press release: Wang was sentenced to 25 years in prison; Chen received 15 years. Department of Justice
• In the Feb 3 2025 case, they imported ton-quantities of precursors from China to the United States in exchange for cryptocurrency payments; websites and crypto accounts (≈ US$900,000) were seized. Department of Justice
• These defendants went to trial and were convicted by a jury. Mr. Wang received a sentence of 25 years in prison, and Ms. Chen received a sentence of 15 years.
  Take-away: This case demonstrates how the U.S. is targeting not only the chemical importation but also the financial infrastructure (crypto, websites) and is securing long sentences for foreign nationals convicted in U.S. courts.

S.D.N.Y. – Indictment of international brokers arrested abroad (Dec 18 2024)

In December 2024, S.D.N.Y. announced an indictment of three brokers (Chinese, Ukrainian, Latvian nationals) alleged to have imported ton-quantities of precursor chemicals knowing that they would be used to make fentanyl and methamphetamine. Department of Justice+1
Important features:

• They were arrested abroad (Morocco) on April 17 2024 and extradited to the U.S. on December 11 2024. Department of Justice+1
• The indictment lists the counts and statutory penalties, as noted above (20-year max for some counts, etc.).
  Take-away: The case highlights cross-border capture and extradition—illustrating that the U.S. is willing and able to bring foreign actors to trial in New York courts.

Extradition Process: Bringing Foreign Indicted Defendants to the United States

When individuals abroad are indicted in the U.S., the question arises: how does the U.S. get them into its custody? The process of extradition and surrender is complex but certain fundamentals apply.

Basics of U.S. Extradition Framework

• The U.S. has extradition treaties (or surrender agreements) with many countries. These treaties typically require “dual criminality” (the offense must be criminal in both jurisdictions) and that the requesting country present the proper documentation. Congress.gov+1
• Under U.S. domestic law, once the Secretary of State (or appropriate authority) receives a valid request, a court may determine whether the individual is extraditable. Foreign Affairs Manual+1
• Even when treaty conditions are met, extradition may be declined on policy, human rights, nationality, or specialty (“you may only be tried for the offenses specified in the request”) grounds. Congress.gov+1
• The U.S. “Office of International Affairs” (part of the U.S. Department of Justice) often plays a central role in coordinating foreign requests and international cooperation.
• Importantly: Extradition is not automatic; it depends on the foreign jurisdiction’s laws, the treaty, and the specifics of the case.

How it plays out in precursor chemical cases

The December 2024 S.D.N.Y. case provides an example: three brokers were arrested abroad (in Morocco) and extradited to the U.S. on December 11 2024. Department of Justice+1

Another example: in May 2024 the U.S. DOJ announced the extradition of a Mexican national (Francisco Pulido Coracero) who allegedly supplied precursor chemicals to the Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación; he was extradited from Mexico to Washington, D.C. and will “face trial.” Department of Justice

Key considerations

• The requesting U.S. authority must show probable cause (or comparable standard) that the person is the correct individual and has committed the acts charged. Congress.gov+1
• The foreign country must assess whether the offense is extraditable under its treaty obligations (including dual criminality).
• Timing and logistics matter: international arrest, transfer, custody, transport to the U.S. may all take months or years.
• The U.S. may secure an arrest via Interpol Red Notice, coordination with foreign law enforcement, mutual legal assistance, etc.
• After extradition, the defendant appears in U.S. federal court (arraignment) and the case proceeds like any federal criminal case.

Implications

For chemical companies or individuals abroad who are supplying precursor chemicals to the U.S. or assisting in manufacturing of fentanyl destined for the U.S., extradition means: you can be indicted in the U.S., arrested overseas (if cooperation exists), brought to the U.S., and tried in a U.S. courtroom. This greatly increases the reach of U.S. enforcement.

Why This Matters & What To Watch

Impact on supply-chain enforcement

These cases show that enforcement is shifting upstream: not just targeting traffickers of finished fentanyl, but the suppliers of precursor chemicals, and their global networks. This is strategic because if the “raw stuff” is disrupted, production is impeded.

Messaging and deterrence

By publicizing the indictments, long sentences, and international arrests, the U.S. Attorney’s Offices are sending a message: foreign entities are not beyond reach. The mention of tens or hundreds of kilograms of precursor chemicals, ton-quantities, mislabeled shipments, cryptocurrency payments—all highlight the scale and seriousness.

Evolving legal landscape

• The notion of “listed chemicals” (List I, List II under the Controlled Substances Act, or the chemical precursor regime) is key. When a chemical is designated as a precursor or “listed chemical,” importation with intent to manufacture a controlled substance becomes a crime.
• The borderless nature of chemical manufacturing, shipping, and global logistics means that jurisdictions like E.D.N.Y. and S.D.N.Y., which are major ports of entry or hubs for financial/international activity, will continue to be focal points.
• Extradition capabilities and international cooperation are critical—cases like the Morocco extradition in December 2024 show the U.S. is willing to pursue defendants globally.

What to monitor

• Future indictments may involve other countries (India, China, Mexico, etc.), other precursor chemicals, and possibly broader financial/crypto investigations.
• The impact of sentencing in these cases may influence how companies and individuals evaluate risks when dealing in chemicals globally.
• Legal developments around listing new precursor chemicals, control regimes, and regulatory enforcement (e.g., customs seizures, mislabelling) will matter.
• Extradition requests and bilateral cooperation: some countries may resist extradition; resource/trust issues may delay or block transfers.

Concluding Thoughts

The federal prosecutions in the Eastern and Southern Districts of New York concerning the importation of fentanyl precursor chemicals reflect a significant shift in the U.S. government’s strategy: moving upstream in the supply chain, targeting foreign companies and brokers who facilitate production of fentanyl by supplying chemicals, and using international law‐enforcement cooperation including extradition to bring defendants into U.S. courts.

For companies, individuals, legal practitioners, and compliance officers, this means that transactions involving chemicals (especially those that can plausibly serve as precursors) are under enhanced scrutiny. The combination of heavy statutory penalties, aggressive enforcement, and international reach means the stakes are high.

Matthew Galluzzo is a federal criminal defense attorney in New York City and a former Manhattan prosecutor. He has successfully represented numerous people charged with federal narcotics offenses, including those accused of trafficking fentanyl resulting in deaths. He also regularly represents foreign nationals, and was knighted by the nation of France for his outstanding work in defending French citizens against criminal charges in the United States. If you or a loved one have been arrested or are about to be extradited for a fentanyl precursor case, you should strongly consider contacting him to discuss his representation.